DOGE Is Sabotaging Trump’s China Goals

This article was written by James Abrahams, Policy Fellow 2024-2025, and originally appeared in Modern Diplomacy. The views in this article are the authors own.

One of the few consistent elements of the Trump administration’s foreign policy is its hardline approach to China. Key figures such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, both known as long-standing China hawks, are leading a shift in strategic focus away from Russia and the Middle East, framing China as the US’s primary geopolitical and strategic threat.

But the administration’s goal to “win” a new Cold War with China is being undermined by the new Department for Government Efficiency (DOGE). Their work is eroding both US soft power and boots-on-the-ground diplomatic and intelligence networks.

One of DOGE’s first acts was to shutter USAID. In February, in addition to some 4,200 staff who were already placed on leave, at least 1,600 employees were fired in what the administration calls a ‘Reduction-in-Force.’ USAID has long been seen as a pillar of American power and influence around the world. Since its creation in 1961, its humanitarian assistance programs and development funding have built long-term relationships with countries and trained future leaders. This contributed to a long-term strategy of soft power: building a solid global network of friendly governments and institutions that would be pro-American and less susceptible to the influence of adversaries such as China. Under Musk’s guise of ‘efficiency,’ all of that is now gone. Unsurprisingly, China is already using this opportunity to exert its influence and grow its soft power, while the US, thanks to DOGE, can offer little but words.

This was evident after a 7.7-magnitude earthquake struck Myanmar just a few weeks ago, killing more than 3,000 people. Trump has pledged aid, but the US response has been slow and remains limited due to the dismantling of USAID’s disaster response capabilities. In the meantime, China swiftly deployed medical workers, sent rescue teams, provided supplies worth 100 million yuan, and began digging up the rubble. Outside of disaster relief, China has also expressed interest in funding NGOs and replacing development programs formerly funded by USAID in Nepal and Colombia, for instance.

It will not be long before China’s exertion of soft power will grow into a fully fledged national security issue. The danger is twofold: soft power relationships, such as those of the US, serve as a precursor to wider economic and military ties. In the case of China, however, the direct threat of espionage is also involved. The CCP’s bugging of the African Union Parliament, ‘gifted’ as an alleged gesture of goodwill, is a prime example of this. By giving the CCP the space to expand their soft power, DOGE has also given it more opportunities to embed itself into the world’s infrastructure and governance. This gives China a worrying advantage in a potential conflict and even the opportunity to threaten US assets. In countries on the US’s doorstep, such as Colombia, and in countries where the US stations servicemen, such as Jordan—both places where USAID played a major role—this risk is greatest.

DOGE will even weaken the US’s ability not only to detect these risks but also to respond to them diplomatically. Its push to downsize the State Department — including through embassy and consulate closures — will ensure Chinese dominance internationally. These outposts act as vital hubs for intelligence gathering and provide infrastructure for swift diplomatic responses to emerging threats. Closing them reduces the US’s ability to defend its interests precisely when threats are increasing — and when China already has more diplomatic facilities than the US.

If the administration continues to be blind to the soft power implications of DOGE and the risks it poses to national security, American power will continue to diminish, and the US will be more vulnerable than ever in the face of a growing Chinese threat. The rhetoric of the administration’s China hawks will, therefore, ring increasingly hollow.