Saudi Arabia’s calculated green conversion
By Oliver Dawson, Policy Fellow 2025-2026. This article originally appeared in Modern Diplomacy.
At the 11th session of the General Assembly of the International Renewable Energy Agency in 2021, Saudi Arabia pledged to generate 50% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030.
As the Kingdom embraces a solar and wind future, the question is no longer whether Riyadh is going green—but why. Underpinning the turbines and panels lies a strategy more about maintaining power than leading a moral eco-crusade.
Mohammed bin Salman’s $270 billion Vision 2030 and the Saudi Green Initiative are doubtlessly bold and trailblazing. The country plans to build up to 130 GW of renewables by the end of the decade, with half of its domestic energy shifting to renewables.
With a geographic monopoly on sun and wind, there is a legitimate prospect of Saudi achieving this. Amidst a global shift towards clean power, the logic of diversifying away from a mono-oil economy to capture new growth seems sensible. The Kingdom has, for example, set the goal of raising its share of non-oil GDP from 16 to 50% by 2030.
By generating more of its domestic power from renewables, the country unlocks capacity to export more of its fossil fuels, helping to preserve its status as one of the world’s foremost hydrocarbon suppliers. The simultaneous strategy of investment into green energy and the maintenance of its fossil fuel industry gives the Kingdom a valuable stake in the energy order of tomorrow, while maintaining its influence in global markets for today.
Saudi Arabia is hedging: if global energy markets accelerate toward clean energy, it has already invested significant expertise and capital expenditure. If fossil fuels remain for decades, it retains its historic muscle while benefitting from lower domestic costs and energy security. Either way, Saudi wins the game.
This dual-track approach has both ambitious milestones and sobering realities to contend with. The country derived just 1.4% of its electricity from low-carbon sources in 2023. Projects in Bisha, Humaij, and Khulis signal future progress, but transformation on this scale remains fraught with difficulty and contingent on global trends.
Saudi’s transition from a pure-oil exporter to a diversified energy hub will also reshape global supply lines, investment philosophies, and the geopolitics of energy. OPEC and its influence may wane, andalliances previously forged in the wells of oil may change.
Will Saudi and others use their future green-energy power to leverage the same relationships they have done from oil? The early signs seem to be yes: the country has signed a memorandum of understanding with European partners to export renewables and green hydrogen, as well as an agreement in Germany to advance hydrogen processing facilities.
This matters for global energy markets. Saudi’s intention to not merely ride the wave of clean energy but help shape it comes with a commitment to export 200,000 tonnes of green hydrogen to Europe by 2030. It is a narrative centered on leadership, strategic dominance, and long-term planning.
Whether Saudi’s green aspirations are borne out of an altruistic philosophy of collective good or to advance its national interests, it is clear that they represent something larger. They form a part in the country’s continued economic hedging and geopolitical continuity—a method through which they can stay indispensable in the global arena. Their effort to diversify is not an escape from fossil fuels but rather a re-engineering of their energy dominance—from crude to clean.
The gap between targets and real generation remains gaping, but with the same ruthless approach the country has applied for decades, it may well succeed in its efforts. That same strategic mindset continues, just augmented in its approach. If the desert fields are shortly to be dotted with solar panels or wind turbines towering over their dunes, remember: the real play is not just about saving the planet—it’s about securing the throne in the next energy age.
