Mini-Report: The Lebanese Armed Forces and Disarming Hezbollah
This mini-report was authored by Alex-Guy Sandler, the Pinsker Centre’s Director of Campus Affairs
President Joseph Aoun used Hezbollah disarmament plans as a flagship policy for his assent to power in 2025. The former Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces now faces intensifying pressure from the US, Israel, and members of the GCC to capitalise on Iranian erosion and Syrian rebuilding to disarm Hezbollah while it remains weakened. This strategic plan would bring kinetic strategy in line with financial strategies to rebuild Lebanon’s state institutions. While more effort is being placed on winding down the Shadow Economy, with action like removing actors like Amal as the primary financial controllers, enforcing a monopoly on force by removing militia capacity will provide the necessary stability for attracting investment, stimulating the cyclical economy and affording debt servicing during Lebanon’s intensive rebuilding process.
The Lebanese Armed Forces share similar vulnerabilities to other Lebanese state institutions, namely cyclical budget erasure and real incomes dropping amidst the persisting Lebanese Currency Crisis. To prevent mass desertion, the Lebanese Defence Budget of almost $800 million annually is set to be primarily spent on salaries and fuel, leaving minimal amounts for training, modernisation, or any of the significant key institutional reforms necessary for the expanded task of disarmament.[1] President Aoun’s first phase requires an excess of 10,000 troops without removing critical presence in other parts of the country; with a strength of potentially 40,000 reservist personnel and thousands of rockets, artillery, and small arms still possessed by Hezbollah, the likelihood of a quick and bloodless disarmament programme remains slim, even with continuous Israeli degradation of existing stockpiles. [2] [3]The LAF is already reliant on wage subsidies from actors like the US and Qatar in excess of $250 million, and will require more effective capabilities to counterbalance Iranian-supplied technology and munitions. An additional complication comes from the demographics of the armed forces, legally required to be an evenly split officer corps between Muslim and Christian demographics. The LAF enjoys far better public perception compared to other institutions but pressure to interfere with private dwellings during searches and demanding policing of the population may quickly undermine this support. [4] There is significant risk from protracted conflict that divides communities and undermines the LAF’s secular reputation.
Further complicating disarmament is the failure of UNIFIL to accomplish its main task of securing a buffer zone in Southern Lebanon. The force, that has consisted of around 7,500 troops, including a helicopter battalion in recent years, has a budget of around $550 million. This is over 50% of the LAF’s whole budget. [5] [6] While nominally in constant cooperation with the LAF, there has been constant difficulty faced by UNIFIL when attempting to investigate private properties or enforce disarmament where suspected launches are taking place. The termination of UNIFIL’s mandate at the end of 2026 and it’s subsequent wind down encapsulates the wasted opportunity to utilise UNIFIL as a monitor and investigator detached from the LAF. UNIFIL could have engaged with different communities in Lebanon in place of the LAF, reducing the impact of policing and investigation on the organisation’s reputation. The termination of the mandate does provide useful funding avenues directly to the LAF, however, with the hundreds of millions likely stretching far further given the size of LAF salaries. There is also the opportunity to explore and expand innovative technologies that could improve surveillance and protection systems and standardise training pathways.
IF the LAF is to achieve some successes in disarmament campaigns it must capitalise on Israeli erosion of Hezbollah capabilities. The LAF must seek to avoid costly engagements that pose a strain on manpower, resources, and communal relations. Learning from mistakes of UNIFIL will require the LAF to operate private dwelling searches both confidently and sensitively. The LAF, through decisive targeting of smaller milita units, may aim to establish both an effective and rapid search of armaments it seeks to disable and capture, while acting as a protective presence for population centres from both Israeli and Militia operations. The long-term goal of actors that seek to minimise the threat of militia groups within Southern Lebanon, be it the Lebanese State, Israeli forces, and the wider international community should converge on seeking to solidify the perception of the LAF as the sole provision of stability in the country.
Sources:
[1] IISS, ‘Chapter Six’.
[2] House of Commons Library, Lebanon 2025: Plans to Disarm Hezbollah.
[3] Beeri and Polak, Key Points of Hezbollah’s Current Military Status January 2026 – Situation Assessment.
[4] Najia Houssari, ‘Lebanese Show Strong Trust in Military, Little Confidence in Parliament, Poll Finds | Arab News’.
[5] IISS, ‘Chapter Six’.
[6]United Nations Secretary-General, Budget for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for the Period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025.
