Report: How can the UAE respond to Iranian aggression
This mini-report was authored by Alex-Guy Sandler, the Pinsker Centre’s Director of Campus Affairs
28th February marked the first Iranian strikes on the United Arab Emirates as part of its wider retaliation towards US-Israeli led air strikes. Tehran stated that it was striking the assets of US forces as opposed to deliberately striking their neighbours within the Persian Gulf.[1] However, the sustained attacks on hotels, airports, and commercial facilities point to the true goal of Iranian forces. As observed in the wake of the 12-Day War, Iranian capacity to have major disruptive impacts on the US and even Israel is limited due to superior air-defence, geographic distance, and domestic resilience programmes.[2] The same cannot be said for a wide range of Gulf states, who are now forced to reach out to increasingly unexpected actors [3] to deescalate and introduce stability.
Over the past few years, the United Arab Emirates has overseen a massive economic expansion, diversifying from oil and energy exports and developing Dubai and Abu Dhabi as centres for the rare material trade and financial services.[4] In 2024 the UAE attracted $45.6 billion in foreign direct investment and planned a massive expansion to strengthen its competitive position. [5] [6] To sustain this, the UAE and the majority of Gulf states, aims to secure stability in the long-term while reducing the threat landscape rapidly.
The Emirati involvement in the Abraham Accords with Israel, backing for groups like STC in Yemen, and fundamental links with Ethiopia and Somaliland have brought the UAE into direct confrontation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the traditional ally for whom Gulf states would look for this kind of regional stability and defence capability. The Gulf is fractured despite the common threat of Iran.
This fragmentation and the risk of long-term instability disrupting vital financial flows make the chances of anything more than symbolic Emirati retaliation in Iran unlikely. The primary goal will be to guarantee a rapid negotiation that deescalates, while addressing certain hardline aspects of the Iranian regime.
Emirati vulnerability, and a lack of adequate defence by the US and other allies may solidify pre-existing feelings of a US in decline within the Middle East, further encouraging the UAE to continue building up its own axis to subvert the influence of actors like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran.[7]
The relationship between the UAE and Israel is likely to strengthen, with cooperation already underway on creating a network of friendly ports in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa[8], and on a large number of technological, environmental, and security projects. Israeli actions in the Gulf, including the recognition of Somaliland and major decapitation and erosion of Iranian-aligned militants complement Emirati goals to wrangle Red Sea trade away from Iranian and Saudi control, while taking significant steps to counterbalance American decline and regional fragmentation.
In reality, the UAE and other Abraham Accords states stand to gain from cooperation with Israel in the post-conflict environment. There are major efforts to increase technological development within the economy, increasing its size relative to energy exports in order to reduce the ability of fellow energy exporters and the global market to control financial flows. This cooperation has already materialised in programmes like the Crystal Ball cybersecurity project[9], and Desertech agricultural innovation. In the post-conflict environment, the UAE will aim to prioritise negating its adversaries' abilities to threaten its infrastructure, and its rivals’ ability to determine its development. Cooperation within the Abraham Accords framework will likely provide ample opportunity to accomplish both.
Sources
[1] ‘Allies of US in the Gulf Bear Brunt of Iran Attacks’, BBC News, 1 March 2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c1jk922dgjgo.
[2] ‘How 12 Days Have Changed Iran’, IISS, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/07/how-12-days-have-changed-iran/.
[3] Andrew Osborn et al., ‘Putin Offers to Use Links to Iran to Help Restore Middle East Calm’, Middle East, Reuters, 2 March 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/kremlin-says-it-is-constant-contact-with-iranian-leadership-over-outright-2026-03-02/.
[4] ‘United Arab Emirates Exports By Category’, https://tradingeconomics.com/united-arab-emirates/exports-by-category.
[5] ‘UAE Cements Its Position as Global Destination for Attracting FDI with Total Inflows of AED 167.6 Billion in 2024’, accessed 5 March 2026, https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bk9kxbg-uae-cements-its-position-global-destination-for.
[6] Sanele Mjikane, ‘UAE’s 2026 Federal Budget Signals Stronger Growth and Investment’, Oxford Economics, 6 November 2025, https://www.oxfordeconomics.com/resource/uaes-2026-federal-budget-signals-stronger-growth-and-investment/.
[7] https://abaadstudies.org, ‘Re-Engineering the Red Sea:The Geopolitical Implications of the Israeli–Emirati Partnership’, Abaad Studies & Research Center, https://abaadstudies.org/en/strategies/topic/60185.
[8] Camille Lons, ‘Power Struggle: What the Saudi-UAE Rivalry Means for the Red Sea—and Europe – European Council on Foreign Relations’, Middle East and North Africa, ECFR, 29 January 2026, https://ecfr.eu/article/power-struggle-what-the-saudi-uae-rivalry-means-for-the-red-sea-and-europe/.
[9] ‘UAE, Israel Ink Pivotal Joint Cyber-Threat Intelligence Agreement’, Dark Reading, https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/uae-israel-joint-cyber-threat-intelligence-agreement.
