REPORT: The IRGC and its role in Iran
This mini-report was authored by Alex Guy-Sandler, the Pinsker Centre’s Director of Campus Affairs.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps exists as a parallel organisation to Iran’s conventional armed forces (known as Artesh), tasked primarily with ensuring the survival of the Islamic Regime. Created by the first Ayatollah in the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, it exists as both a direct check on the successor to the Imperial Army and the dominant actor in the Iranian Armed Forces landscape. [1] The role of the IRGC and its Quds Force in supporting allied fighters in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, demonstrate its ability to project significant power in the region. [2] The IRGC is often the major actor in internal security crises, such as during the protests in 2023, 2025 and 2026. [3]
Ideologically the IRGC has developed a hard-line Shiite stance, entrenched by steady indoctrination. IRGC conscripts are recruited almost exclusively from the Basij (its 600,000 strong paramilitary organisation) [4], in indoctrination schools and universities [5] across the country. The Corps itself dates back to the Revolution and has often operated as a political actor, engaging in anti-reformist and anti-liberal manoeuvring since the 1990s.
IRGC cultural norms assume protests and reform movements pose existential threats to the Islamic nature of the regime, assuming protests are the product of foreign machinations to undermine the Revolution internally and globally. [6] The robust political research and propaganda teams within the Basij and IRGC continue to endorse these beliefs, allowing effective policing of the state’s population that the Artesh, a majority conscripted force [7], would likely pose strategic and ideological objections to. The role of the IRGC, trained proxies, and the Basij in policing movements has continued to expand. This in turn has reinforced the cultural polarisation that solidifies the regime's monopoly on violence, as potential dissenters are removed from positions where they could mount meaningful opposition.
Financial and hardware advantages of the Corps enforce its primacy, while drastically limiting the Artesh’s capacity to operate independently. The IRGC receives up to 1/3rd of non-taxed oil revenues and dominates the energy and banking sectors of the Iranian economy; the IRGC boasts real incomes of up to $13 billion [8] compared to the Artesh’s $3 billion. [9]
The Corps’ advantage is also clear in their access to vital systems in accordance with Tehran’s strategic doctrine. The Artesh, as a conventional war-fighting force, focuses on large, capital-intensive systems that are seldom used outside of emergencies. The IRGC’s singular hold on strategic rockets and missiles, naval anti-access capabilities, and drone and hypersonic monopolies [10] allow it to project power significantly more effectively. The Corps is responsible for the majority of deterrence posturing and organising drone manufacturing [11], it is also tasked with developing dual-use technologies and playing a leading role in the Iranian Space and Nuclear programmes. The Artesh is deprived of strategic influence, and heavily dependent on the IRGC for vital systems.
The comparative size, access to critical systems and entrusted responsibility of the IRGC compared to other revolutionary guard-style organisations can be explained by its capture of the political and economic apparatus within Iran. The Corps is designed to be ideologically and materially self-sustaining, while the Artesh as the force of the state remains underfunded and tightly constrained.
Sources:
[1] Annika Ganzeveld, ‘Order of Battle of the Iranian Artesh Ground Forces’, Institute for the Study of War, 14 August 2025, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/order-of-battle-of-the-iranian-artesh-ground-forces/.
[2] Farzin Nadimi, ‘Iran’s National Army Reorganizes | The Washington Institute’, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-national-army-reorganizes.
[3] ‘The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) | Council on Foreign Relations’, 30 January 2026, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/irans-revolutionary-guards.
[4] International Institute for Strategic Studies, ed., MILITARY BALANCE: 2024 (ROUTLEDGE, 2024), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003485834.
[5] Saeid Golkar, THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD,
[6] Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (Oxford university press, 2016).
[7] International Institute for Strategic Studies, MILITARY BALANCE.
[8] Dalga Khatinoglu, ‘Tax Increase in Iran to Finance the IRGC and Religious Institutions’, Middle East Forum, 31 December 2025, https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/tax-increase-in-iran-to-finance-the-irgc-and-religious-institutions.
[9] ‘Iran’s Defense Spending’, https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/iran-defense-spending.
[10] Maya Carlin, ‘How Powerful Is Iran’s Army?’, Center for Security Policy, 21 September 2022, https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/how-powerful-is-irans-army/.
[11] Kasra Aarabi, ‘Beyond Borders: The Expansionist Ideology of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’, https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/beyond-borders-expansionist-ideology-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps.
